Mission Statement & Acknowledgements

Anamnesis is the student-edited philosophy journal of Colorado College. The journal publishes philosophical undergraduate essays from colleges and universities nationwide. Colorado College students founded the journal in order to give their peers a taste of what the discipline can be at its best. In line with this goal, we aim to publish clearly written, elegantly argued essays. We also strive to publish essays that directly pertain to the most intreresing, difficult, and pressing issues in both philosophy and our lives.

We would like to thank Cutler Publications for making the journal possible this year. We'd also like to thank Sharon Krishek and Rick Furtak for their thoughtful insights and support.

Letter from the Editors

In the fourth volume of Anamnesis, we decided to organize essays around the theme of “Perspectives.” This decision was inspired by a desire to accommodate essays that are not thought of as traditionally within the discipline of philosophy, but still follow a philosophical line of thought. Our goal in this issue is to challenge the reader’s conception of the role of philosophy in everyday life. Philosophy is too often written off as inaccessible or even irrelevant outside the realm of academia. With “Perspectives,” we hope to emphasize the ways in which individual subjective experience can be understood philosophically. We aim to break out of tradition and highlight different directions in which undergraduates are taking philosophical concepts.

We begin the issue with an essay by Matt Rosen, a sopho- more at Colorado College, who we hope will inspire readers to reconsider the significance of progressive political philosophy. Following this, we have Amanda Pinto’s essay on ableism in the college classroom, which is a fresh perspective on an issue many of us have grown too familiar with. Max Chiaramonte provides us with our third essay, which complicates our rela- tionship with videogames by looking at them through the lens of object-oriented ontology. Finally, we conclude with an inter- view with Sharon Krishek, who offers a unique perspective on the role of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of love and faith in today’s world. As this publication continues to grow, we hope it will at- tract students who are inspired by the diversity of perspectives our world has to offer. Thank you to everyone who submitted, and to those who helped us through the production process. We are excited to see where Anamnesis goes in the future.

We hope you enjoy.

-Anne Daley, Natalie TeSelle, and Lizzy Vian

In Praise of Welcoming

Remarks on the Ethics of Politics

Matt Rosen • Colorado College

If we are going to speak of perspectives in the plural, it is imperative that we speak of welcoming. It is imperative that we speak of what is happening outside the invisible yet solid walls of our campus, what is happening in this city and this state, this country, and ultimately, what is happening in a truly global sense. 

The plurality of perspectives has never been more prominent, and yet this remains an uneasy time to be classed as ‘different.’ Difference proliferates, but it does so in the shadows. Here at Colorado College, the word is ‘diversity,’ but it is a word with no referent. It masks the troubled space in which desire for otherness and fear of otherness intersect, in which a student body yearning for new perspectives and an institution tasked with capitalist accumulation meet. Since ‘diversity’ refers to no one in particular, it’s safe, but it can never be acted on. It is only about the count of bodies. There is nothing to do with it, and its impact on discourse is indirect at best. It is a purely theoretical locution that never forces us to pose the question of practice, even the practice of theory.

In this city, difference is in peril. We all know this to be the case; we call it ‘conservativism,’ but what we mean is that the status quo, the same, is always conserved. Strangers are expected to conform in some way, to enter into communal bonds in which they can be categorized and set into place. Taxonomy carries the day. You are either ‘with us’ or ‘against us,’ you are either part of ‘us’ or one of ‘them.’ The community itself is to be preserved, even at the cost of locked gates and high walls. 

This rhetoric is also the rhetoric of our nation. Our southern border is being fortified to keep out the veritable other, the other who apparently threatens our nation’s stability, although we can’t quite say why or how. Visas are more challenging to obtain, citizenship seems a farther stretch for many than it used to, and some have already begun to leave. At the helm of our nation, we’ve placed a man terrified of outsiders, terrified of difference in any form whatsoever. The law of the land is being rewritten: “conform or leave.” “Either be ‘like’ us by a degree of not-too-many standard deviations or go somewhere else.” 

But it is not just our nation that is closing the door to the stranger. In the rest of the world, borders are defended by increasingly substantial military presences, travel is increasingly costlier and more dangerous, and migration is increasingly seen as a threat, not only to national security but to the security of families, communities, neighborhoods, and so on. Nationalism, which is just the political form of xenophobia, is on the rise, and it’s not hard to see why. If we permit someone who is totally unlike us to speak, they may dissent, they may seek to rupture the bonds that hold us together as a nation, as a people, as a community, as a cohesive unit. And yet, these bonds have never seemed more fragile or more illusory then they do now. 

Differences in perspective have become (or have remained) a thing to be rooted-out. In the re-education-through-labor of our school system, children are taught to think and act alike, to work together insofar as their goals and the stipulations of the project at hand are shared, but only in that case. We must all use the same grammar, speak the same language, learn the same material (‘core curriculum’), and prepare ourselves for the same future. We must all chant the same pledge of allegiance to the same country, a country with values that we all must share: ‘one nation, indivisible.’ 

In lieu of egalitarianism, the liberal capitalism of ‘democracy’ runs amok. Our politicians are not humans among humans, but the first of humans, the chosen representatives who can conjure up what is in our best interests better than we can, or so we are told. Unity of voice and mind trumps alterity. Showing hospitality to others is a gamble, so we choose the angst of the self-same instead. “Who cares if the world looks bleak and desolate, if it is characterized by a boredom with no parallel, as long as everyone speaks, acts, and thinks like I do?” And if we’re feeling especially generous, we call this I, ‘we.’ But ‘we’ remains a singular subject; ‘we’ remains univocal and must. The linkage of ‘like me, like us’ is taken to be prior to difference, more important than difference. 

And in this world devoid of difference, in a world in which otherness is the fear par excellence, we refuse to imagine that things could be otherwise. Not only do we expel the stranger, but we expel along with the stranger the possibility of another relationship with the future. We expel the capacity for change or novelty. We do not seek a ‘new symbolization,’ a new way of being in the world, either because we think that this is the best it can get and we’re comfortable here, that this is the best it’s ever been, or else because we are afraid that the project of re-imagining the world is just too risky to undertake. Under the mark of ‘liberty,’ or some ‘realistic’ principle, we dismiss the egalitarian hypothesis as ineffectual or fantastical, as a youthful dream. We set aside the youthful ‘idealism’ to which, instead, we must stake a claim as the only true realism.

In the war against perspectives that differ, and sometimes radically, from our own, the Academy is not a bastion of openness and hospitality. Indeed, philosophy has long perpetuated the insider/outsider, us/them dichotomy; philosophy has long been culpable in the locking of doors and the shutting of gates, or else it has remained silent. Philosophy cannot think the position of the ordinary person because it always thinks it as a position. The generic thought of the person is given another name and thought as that name: Being, the One, the All. Even the exceptions to the name are thought as inhuman, naming what cannot name the person: the Event, Contingency, Void, the Real. 

Philosophical ethics replace people with principles or think people structurally, as implicated always in systems or apparatuses larger than themselves. In the last instance, philosophy always poses the question of the structure, the question of politics, and dispenses with anything generically human as naïve. 

Kant tells us that people have dignity and deserve respect insofar as they can be deemed rational; a person is an ‘end in themselves’ only if a principle (rationality) can be validated. Bentham and Mill posit a principle of utility that measures people in a qualifiable, even quantifiable, manner. Ethics becomes calculation, the weighing of a scale, a cost/benefit analysis. Aristotle and Confucius determine ethics in the position of virtues, the oscillation towards a virtuous mean of thought and of behavior. In each case, the generic person is re-thought according to an inhuman apparatus: the quality of rationality, the principle of utility, a list of virtues. In each case, those who are different must conform to the given arbiter of worth in order to be seen as ethical subjects. The southern border gets renamed: rationality, utility, virtue. But the problem is the same; the gates of our discipline should read ‘no one who is too different shall enter here.’ 

Philosophical ethics, as embodied in Kant, Mill, and Aristotle, among others, poses a single question: how do we think the stranger? But the question of generic ethics, of the ethic of the ordinary person, is different: how do we think with the stranger? How do we think alongside the stranger? 

Around the world, tragedy remains and becomes a feature of life; affliction is a fact outside of the control of people and in the hands of those who do not have to live it. The victim of this affliction is, for philosophy, the unthinkable; the victim is impossibility itself. Philosophy cannot think with the victim but can only think the victim under one of its other guises, in the donation of another name: Utility, Dignity, Rationality, Moral Worth. That which is rigorously human, through and through, is unavailable to a philosophy that always determines the person in advance as part of a structure, as implicated in a system, or as a participant in a shared ‘yes/no’ discourse of ‘reason’ or ‘common-sense.’ 

It is not fashionable to ask the question of the human, to speak of people. Today, the post-human, the after-human, the inhuman, are in vogue. But the generic person should not be confused with the disastrous humanism that proved so horrific in the twentieth century. The person is not a conception of the person because the person cannot be thought under one of its other philosophical names that would be its concept, such as Being or the One. The person refuses the violence of subsumption under the logic of the concept. The human that I am speaking of is the human in the most general of terms, the human of a lived experience which is not at all open to a philosophy which demands that it be thought in terms of its abstraction. This is the human who always flies under the philosophical radar. 

It is easy to fall back into the conceptualization of the victim, the other, the migrant, the person in any sense, when they appear only on the television, in the news, as a headline which speaks of some faraway place. Philosophy triumphs in the distance between us and the victim. But sometimes the victim is you, sometimes it is someone or something you love, sometimes it is right next door, in your home, your neighborhood, your community. And in this case, the distance of philosophical ethics, the thinking of all perspectives under a new and unifying name, seems strange and problematic. Suddenly, the question of the victim is absolutely immanent; it is an immediate matter. It is in this moment that a generic ethic is called for, it is in this moment that welcoming is really no longer a question at all because the person who cannot be seen by philosophy is, all of a sudden, the clearest thing in the world, the supreme unquestionability. 

A generic ethic does not seek to explain or re-create a law by which the human can be set-into-place, a law in which differences of perspective can be reconciled. But it is also not a relativism; it does not say ‘to each, their own.’ It rather demands that each be welcomed in a no matter what fashion, without regard to the qualities or identities that they bring to the table. For a generic ethic, the words ‘you are welcome here because’ or ‘you are welcome here despite’ signify a return to the philosophical ethic. Welcoming pays no attention to predicates but is universal towards every singular thing. These gates read: ‘let each enter here.’ 

But this does not mean that tolerance is also universal, that we must surrender and give ourselves over to whomever we encounter. There are times in which welcoming calls for, even demands, resistance. Imagine welcoming two people, a refugee and a nationalist. As we have said, a generic ethic which thinks alongside the ordinary person and does not think them under another name demands an absolute hospitality; both the refugee and the nationalist must be welcomed in a no matter what fashion. But this does not mean that the refugee’s perspective and the nationalist’s perspective, that all of their qualities as distinguished from whatever they may be in themselves, also must be welcomed. 

Welcoming strips away all of the qualities of those who are shown its hospitality, it pays no attention to them. In welcoming both the refugee and the nationalist, we may find that the nationalist’s qualities impose a form of colonization onto the refugee, thinking that refugee under a non-generic name such as Enemy, Opponent, Danger, Terrorist, and so on. In this case, welcoming both the refugee and the nationalist condemns us to resist the nationalist’s predicative imposition, the nationalist’s violence towards the refugee. And since there are always many strangers at our door, it is often the case that resistance can be derived from the absolute hospitality of a generic ethic. 

In a world filled to the brim with undeniable difference, our politics and our philosophies often aim precisely at its denial. And since alterity is undeniable at the level of ordinary people, these politics and philosophies strike us as utterly inhuman, as structural or systemic, as out-of-touch or out-of-control. So let this be a call to action, a call to theoretic arms, an ode in praise of welcoming: let each, no matter who they are, enter here. Instead of thinking each and every other under a name or perspective which is our own, which is given by a givenness which is self-same to us, may we think alongside all of those others who philosophy pronounces as inexistent, who philosophy denies. May we think with the other who we have welcomed in a no matter what fashion. 

On Kierkegaard and Non-Preferential Love

An interview with Sharon Krishek

Dr. Sharon Krishek is a professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She specializes in the role of religiosity and philosophy of  love as it relates to the wellbeing of humans. She is a scholar of the 19th century philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and the author of Kierkegaard on Faith and Love. During her visit in March, we had the opportunity to ask her about her philosophical views on Kierkegaard, love, faith, and subjectivity. We found her interpretation to be an interesting and provocative take on one of the most influential existentialists. We felt her perspective on the topics we discussed would provide a unique philosophical experience for the readers of Anamnesis

Anamnesis: Why is Kierkegaard specifically relevant to us today? What can Kierkegaard tell us about the world socially and politically?

Sharon Krishek: I think that good philosophical work is always relevant. There are some truths about human existence and the nature of reality that are always calling for our attention and are always relevant. In that sense, Kierkegaard is an existentialist. What he has to say about human nature, the nature of existing with other people, and with reality is unfathomable in many ways. Of course, it is as relevant today as it was in the 19th century. He wasn’t a political philosopher, but I think that he is extremely relevant today regarding questions about how to treat people. For him, love was the center, and I am being careful here because it can easily sound like a cliché. But here I am in disagreement with him: He thinks that if we want to understand the nature of love, we have to turn to the commandment of love: “you should love thy neighbor as thyself.” I think that the commandment of love is extremely important, but neighborly love is only one kind of love. It doesn’t capture the essence of love. It is one important manifestation of this phenomenon of love. But if you think about this commandment, of course it is extremely relevant to the state of politics today with all the suspicion and hostility. So, I’m not a political scholar either, but I am very interested in how morality is important to politics. Kierkegaard gives us a very difficult moral ideal to fulfill, but I think it is a very admirable thing to truly love any given person. It sounds strange. What does it mean to love any given person? We hardly know what love is when we think about romantic love, about parental love, about friendship. It is difficult enough to understand what love is given these experiences. To take these experiences and then say “okay, take this love and give it to any given person including your enemy--” this sounds as if we are enduring some confusion here. But I think not. I think we can actually love. Of course, it’s not romantic love, it’s something else. But it’s love. So if we listen to Kierkegaard, if we are convinced by this ideal, I think the world would be a much better place. In that sense I think it’s very important. 

A: It has been said that Kierkegaard’s thought sometimes tends to be sexist or chauvinistic. Do you agree with this, and if so, how would you sort of reconcile Kierkegaard’s philosophy with our understanding of sexism today? Is there a way to “save” Kierkegaard from being sexist?


SK: I don’t see anything sexist at all actually, but you should remember the context: It was the 19th century, and yes, there are things that he says that to our ears may sound sexist, but I don’t think that, essentially, he’s sexist. He’s a humanist, and you cannot be truly humanist [if you are sexist]. Maybe in his personal life he was sexist, I don’t know, I don’t care. From a philosophical point of view, it would have been inconsistent of him to develop humanistic ideals and then be sexist. Here and there you can find sentences that are sexist. Surely today we would have expected him to phrase things differently. But I think it is more a result of the time that he was writing, and not something essential in his work. This is true with regards also to his anti-Semitic sayings. You can find them here and there, but I don’t think it’s interesting. To focus on that is like putting too much emphasis on something that is marginal to his thought. I think the same is true with all the 19th century philosophers. For example, Nietzsche has sayings that you could think “wow what a chauvinist, what a sexist,” or “what an anti-Semite he was.” But I think you should go and see the essence of his philosophy, and if part of his philosophical thesis was chauvinistic, that would be a problem. But the sayings here and there about woman being, I don’t know…

A: Needs to love.  


SK: The need to love, the need of love he attaches to every human being. 


A: But he describes the essence of women as “needing to love.”


SK: I think he describes the essence of every human being as [needing to love]. This is in Works of Love. It is true here and there he can say something like “yes, the man does this and that, and the woman, she needs that the man will love her.” Or something like that. First of all, it’s not very repetitive. You find it here and there, and it’s not part of the major ideas. 

A: I am curious about how that plays an important role in this idea of non-preferential or neighborly love. Is there a specific metaphysical framework required to uphold this category of “human” that you described as all-desiring of that baseline level of love? How do you come to that category, and is there room for flexibility? For instance, coming at it from outside of a humanistic perspective, is there a way to talk about preferential love without having to come to a definition of a human subject?


SK: I’m not very sure I understand the question, but I think that part of being human is to have preferences. I think there is something misleading and very problematic in Works of Love that drove this dichotomy between preferential and neighborly love. I think part of it is for the purpose of rhetoric…I think Kierkegaard is confused. On the one hand, he does affirm preferential love. He does say specifically that it is okay to love in this way. On the other hand, he contrasts it with neighborly love. There is a very complicated story going on there, and I think that Works of Love is unsatisfying. But I think, of course this neighborly love and preferential love are reconcilable. I mean, there is no contradiction. Of course we have to understand there are many questions we have to ask before we can address your question. We have to understand what love is. What are we talking about when we are talking about love? And then we have to see what is the common basis between neighborly love and, for example, romantic love, and then we can see whether it is reconcilable or not. Under a certain understanding of love which is not entirely Kierkegaardian, but it is reconcilable with things that Kierkegaard is saying. Under a specific understanding of love, you can both love any given person in a certain way and you have special relationships and different kinds of love with other people. It’s like friendship and romantic love, they work together, right? You can have ten friends and one husband or wife, right? It’s not a problem. You can have this attitude. It’s very difficult of course, but in principle you can love any given person and that does not mean that you cannot romantically love onlooker y one person. 

A: What about something that is non-human? 

SK: What do you mean by…

A: Kierkegaard’s thought and your thought kind of takes for given that we are only talking about humans. What distinguishes humans—and I’m assuming you mean from other forms of life—is that humans have this ability to love. 

SK: Yes. You mean like animals?

A: Sure, let’s use animals. 

SK: No, that’s a different question. And I admit that I don’t think Kierkegaard is interested in that question. For him, the affirmation of life and of the world includes not just humans. But when he speaks about love, he is interested, first of all, in love for God and then in love for humans. Because he is going with the two commandments: love God, love your neighbor. So, when he talks about love, this is what interests him. It doesn’t mean he doesn’t think we can have love for animals, love for nature, love for the world--he even talks about love for nature when he wants to give an example how you can have the same kind of love while acknowledging the diversity of objects. He says, consider love for nature. When you love nature, you love the lily and you love the tree, and on each level of nature you will see the difference between different kinds of flowers and different kinds of trees, but you love them in the same love. So, he wants to say the same is possible in regard to humans. But he doesn’t give us a theory about what it means to love animals and nature, even though of course he doesn’t exclude them. It doesn’t mean you can love only humans. 


A: We were hoping to talk about a problem we saw with preferential love: You talked about preferential love being potentially selfish. If you choose to love someone preferentially because of certain characteristics, couldn’t that slip into a justification for avoiding certain races, or groups of people, or other religions, and avoiding preferential love because of stereotypes? Matt Rosen, a student in the Junior Seminar class wants to know: “Today, at a time during which it seems that welcoming the stranger is very much in peril as a practice and as an ideal worth upholding, do you worry that preferential love sometimes gets in the way of loving those who are truly other to us?” So obviously, we have the neighborly love thing going on, but what about how preferential love privileges certain people, and what if I only choose to love other people that are like me? 

SK: So, of course this is wrong in Kierkegaard’s point of view. When he condemns preferential love, this is precisely because he is afraid that we will love only those that it comes naturally for us to love. We have natural tendencies, natural inclinations, but he condemns that, of course. First of all, I think he would say that nobody is really other than us because we are all humans, and you should love the enemy as well, [even though] your inclination is not to be with him, but even there Kierkegaard demands you to love him. So, of course, the idea of neighborly love or universal love addresses this concern. And, as I said, I think that both are reconcilable. I mean, it’s not either/or. Kierkegaard doesn’t so much tell us a lot about the nature of love, he more tells about how it is correct to love, and part of loving correctly is to have this openness to loving any given person. Nobody expects you to love everybody romantically, right? It’s not desirable. So, it’s not a problem that you will romantically love only one or two or three. Nobody in any moral theory expects that everybody will be your friends. No, this is not the point. There is a certain attitude that you are required to address to any given person and the interesting question is why to call this love. I think there is an answer to that question.

A: What would you say to people who don’t agree with the basic premise in Kierkegaard’s thought that he’s working from a religious, specifically Christian, framework? I know we talked about this in the seminar, but people are concerned that if you don’t accept this initial truth, then how can you accept the rest of it? And what would you say to someone who is fundamentally against that first premise?


SK: This is a very difficult question. Again, it goes beyond Kierkegaard. As a theistic person myself, I wonder--and this is, again, these are open questions for me—I don’t have an answer yet. But, I wonder if you can truly be moral, you know, to fulfill morality at its highest, if you are not theistic. I know that many people, of course, will disagree with me. But again, this is why I frame it as a question. I’m not saying that this is my claim. But, specifically with Kierkegaard it depends on what kind of atheist you are. I mean, if you are an open-minded atheist, then you can, you know—again, my colleagues in Israel are all atheist, and they read my work and can communicate with me even though they don’t accept my conclusions. This is part of my challenge: to show how basic things that are most important for me can resonate if you do not accept the theistic framework. But it is difficult. It is difficult, and I think that for someone who is an atheist there will be a point in Kierkegaard that he will not be able to move forward. He will say, ‘this is where our ways depart.’ And this is fair enough. Sometimes you just don’t share the same assumptions. It doesn’t have to be theism against atheism. I mean, someone who has a material world-view and someone who has an idealistic worldview will maybe not be able to find a common language. Yeah, this is disturbing because we believe—I believe that there is truth, OK? And, and so we all have the access to the truth, but, yes, I suppose that part of our finitude and limitedness is that those of us who don’t agree with each other, maybe we will have to continue to try to show [our logic]. What I’m trying to do—and I have many students who are atheists—I’m trying to show them the logic. You can even take it as a thought experiment: just for the sake of this discussion let’s assume that there is a loving god. What do we gain by that? Now of course this is not enough—this is not enough at all because we want to know the truth: if there is God or if there isn’t a God. I don’t know if I can do this, philosophically, maybe this is something like the leap of faith. But I think that if you’re open minded enough so that you can at least try to listen, what you can learn about reality or how your attitude to reality can profit by this. OK, don’t agree with me, just listen. Just see that this is, again, brings us back to the uniqueness of Kierkegaard and why I love Kierkegaard so much. You know he’s not a dogmatic philosopher. Of course, he has these dogmas, he has these beliefs, and as I said in the seminar he doesn’t bother to justify these beliefs: “this is what I believe in: take it or leave it.” But he doesn’t start with that, he starts with something universal, with existential concerns that are related to theists and atheists alike, and then he’s showing us how a religious framework addresses these concerns. You can maybe be convinced by that, or you can say, “no this is not good enough for me because I want something more…” you know, more convincing. This gives me a more harmonious way to live with the world. But to be truly religious as Kierkegaard demands of you it’s not an easy life. It demands a lot of sacrifice. So, again, it is a very complicated question and, you know, I still struggle with it myself. 

A: So, you would at least hope that the atheist isn’t completely turned off by Kierkegaard and at least entertain this possibility of a God, and to even read a lot of his work not looking to maybe get the same thing out of it that you are. Certainly it’s beautiful writing, and there are other things about it that you can gain—

SK: And again, I think you can go a long way with him before you should decide if you are committed to his theism or not. This is his existentialism, you know, he does a lot of existential work before getting in the theistic framework that addresses this existential work. So in that sense I think, yes, that many people can find many interesting things in Kierkegaard, but of course if you are not in some sense attracted to a spiritual kind of thinking then that’s fine, it’s not that everybody has to love Kierkegaard or to find value in him. I think it’s a shame but OK, people with different sensitivities will find they are not drawn to Kierkegaard.